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1 Introduction
Stability is a highly desirable property for political systems. The modeling
of political interactions has to take stability requirements into account. In
coalitional models, stability is defined as the possibility of achieving, for
any preference profile, a state that no coalition would oppose. In strate-
gic models, this amounts to the existence, for any preference profile, of an
equilibrium (solvability). However it is commonly known that most political
systems are unstable in this sense. In mathematical social sciences, results
known as impossibility theorems reflect the fact that stability (or solvabil-
ity) is rather hard to obtain. Therefore it is interesting to investigate the
properties of unstable mechanisms.
As a first step in this investigation we introduce a stability index. This
is an integer that measures the likelihood of the emergence of a situation
where the power mechanism is unable to reach a stable outcome. Such
an index may be used to compare political institutions or collective choice
mechanisms. Power distributions with a lower index will be deemed less
stable than those with a higher index. Other indices of stability exist in the
literature, but they are concerned with games not game forms, and they are
defined for some equilibrium point. Our index, on the other hand, is defined
for power mechanisms and some solution concept, not for concrete situations
generated by some preference profile. It is determined by the configurations
that may produce instability.
Although this investigation can be carried out in a far more general
setting (see Abdou and Keiding (2003) for the general notion of effectiv-
ity structure), we shall focus in this study on the so-called local effectiv-
ity functions. While effectivity functions appear naturally in the study of
implementation theory (Moulin and Peleg, 1982; Peleg and Winter, 2002;
Peleg, 2004; Peleg and Peters, 2008), as well as in the theory of Constitu-
tions and Rights (Peleg, 1998), local effectivity functions are closely related
to the solvability problem (Abdou, 1995, 2000). In their investigation of
game form solvability (e.g. for Nash or strong Nash equilibrium), Abdou
and Keiding (2003) pointed out two new aspects related to the power dis-
tribution: (1) the dependence of this power on the current state (the local
aspect), (2) the interactive character of the power (involving the simulta-
neous action of many coalitions). In this paper we limit ourselves to the
local aspect only, but instead of deriving our object from a strategic game
form, we define it abstractly. Like an effectivity function, a local effectivity
function describes the power of coalitions to achieve an outcome in some
subsets of alternatives, but unlike an effectivity function, this power may
depend on the current state. Our choice to restrict our attention on this ob-
ject is justified by its simplicity, its natural interpretation and the elegance
of the properties involved in its analysis. However, despite this restriction,
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the local aspect adds an original ingredient and reveals new properties that
cannot be articulated if we limit the study to effectivity functions. Stability
of local effectivity functions is defined as the non-vacuity of the core for all
preference profiles.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of local effectivity func-
tions may be deduced as a particular case of stability of effectivity structures
(Abdou and Keiding, 2003, Theorem 6) and therefore characterization of
stability is not the central question of this article. Here our main objective
is to further investigate, what can be said when the local effectivity function
is unstable. The notion of cycle lies at the heart of stability characteriza-
tion. This fact, known since Condorcet, turns out to be very general. A
cycle (definition 3.1) is a sequence of potential objections that obeys a com-
binatorial property that guarantees their compatibility. The existence of a
cycle is equivalent to the existence of some profile for which any potential
state is opposed by some coalition. Therefore, to study instability we must
explore the structure of cycles. Defining a stability index is a first step in
that direction.
The idea that lies behind our notion of stability index is that small cyclic
configurations are more likely to emerge than larger ones. Any such configu-
ration includes potentially (1) the formation of a coalition structure and (2)
the elaboration of a coordinated action among the members of each coali-
tion in order to oppose some package of alternatives. Since the formation of
coalitions and the coordination of actions are costly, we implicitly postulate
that configurations with a small number of coalitions and concerted actions
are more likely to surface than larger ones. In accordance with this idea, our
index will be defined precisely as the mimimal length of all possible cycles
(+∞ in case of stability). This number does not exhaust all the features of
instability, but does provide a meaningful classification of instability types.
If the cardinality of the alternative set is p, the stability index can be any
integer between 2 and p. If the power distribution is such that the index
is 2, then instability takes a particularly simple form: alternatives can be
partitioned into two aggregates, or two major issues, on which the society
is split, and the power of coalitions allowed by the rules is such that both
issues can be opposed and neither one can be forced (political stalemate or
deadlock). Situations with a low index will be illustrated by examples from
politics.
As direct applications of this definition, we identify the index of some
subclasses of local effectivity functions. In the case of simple games, our
index can be viewed as the analog of the Nakamura number (Nakamura,
1979). Indeed, when the stability index is finite then it coincides with the
Nakamura number (Corollary 4.8). However, it should be emphasized that
we provide a new interpretation of this notion. Classically the Nakamura
3
number is used as a criterion for stability : A simple game acting on some
alternative set is stable if and only if the number of alternatives is strictly
lower than the Nakamura number. With our interpretation we can add that
even if the action of the simple game is unstable the Nakamura number
provides a measure of instability: it is viewed as a stability index.
The second class for which we determine the stability index is that of
maximal effectivity functions (Theorem 4.10). This is an important case in
applications since the β-effectivity associated to a strategic game form is
maximal. The index is determined by checking classical properties: regu-
larity, superadditivity and subadditivity. Our method for the general case
consists in extracting two appropriate effectivity functions from the local
effectivity function, and to check whether they coincide. When this is the
case, the local effectivity function is said to be exact. Again, in the class of
maximal local effectivity functions, we can determine the stability index: by
checking exactness and classical properties of effectivity functions (Theorem
4.16). It is remarkable that for unstable maximal effectivity functions and
indeed for unstable maximal local effectivity functions, the stability index
is always either 2 or 3.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, local effectivity functions
and related concepts are defined. Cycles are the main object of Section 3.
Section 4 is devoted to the study of the stability index. The index is defined,
motivated, interpreted and illustrated by examples. Its relationship to the
Nakamura number is established in Subsection 4.2. The determination of the
stability index of maximal effectivity functions is the object of Subsection
4.3 and that of maximal local effectivity functions is the object of Subsection
4.4. In Subsection 4.5, we deduce a classification of strategic game forms
based on the stability index of the β-core and the exact core solutions. We
conclude in Section 5.
2 The model
In this section we define a model of interaction that specifies the power
distribution of a set of agents over some set of alternatives, with no explicit
reference to any strategic mechanism that gives rise to that power. We
shall see later (definition 2.5) how, starting from a strategic mechanism
(i.e. a game form) one can derive an appropriate description of the power
distribution induced by the strategies. The notions that we present in this
section, have in common that only the independent power held by coalitions
is represented. They are encompassed by the concept of local effectivity
function. We shall see that the latter includes, as particular cases, effectivity
functions and simple games.
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2.1 Basic notations
Throughout this paper we shall consider a finite set N , the elements of
which are called players or agents, and a finite set A, the elements of which
are called alternatives or states. We make use of the following notational
conventions: For any set D, we denote by P(D) the set of all subsets of D
and by P0(D) = P(D)\{∅} the set of all non-empty subsets of D. Elements
of P0(N) are called coalitions. N\S is denoted S
c. Similarly if B ∈ P(A),
A\B is denoted Bc. L(A) will denote the set of all linear orders on A (that is
all binary relations on A which are complete, transitive, and antisymmetric).
R ∈ L(A) will be interpreted as a preference relation on A. A preference
profile (over A) is a map from N to L(A), so that a preference profile is an
element of L(A)N . For every preference profile RN ∈ L(A)
N and S ∈ P0(N)
we put
P (a, S,RN ) = {b ∈ A | b 6= a, b R
i a, ∀i ∈ S}
(so that P (a, S,RN ) consists of all the outcomes considered to be better
preferred to a by all members of the coalition S), and P c(a, S,RN ) =
A\P (a, S,RN ).
2.2 Local effectivity functions
In the study of game form solvability, the idea that the power of a coalition
may depend on the current state, arises naturally. This is the reason why a
local effectivity function was first introduced in Abdou (1995), but only as
an object related to a game form and an equilibrium concept (e.g. Nash or
strong Nash). In this paper we shall work with an abstract coalitional form,
where the power of coalitions depends on the current state1.
Definition 2.1 A local effectivity function on (N,A) is a family E ≡ (E [U ],
U ∈ P0(A)) where for any U ∈ P0(A), E [U ] : P(N) → P(P0(A)) and such
that the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) E [U ](S) = ∅ if and only if S = ∅,
(ii) B ∈ E [U ](S), B ⊂ B′ ⇒ B′ ∈ E [U ](S),
(iii) U ⊂ V ⇒ E [V ](S) ⊂ E [U ](S).
The formula B ∈ E [U ](S) is interpreted as follows: When the current state
is in U , coalition S can adapt its response in order to realize some state in
B. Let RN ∈ L(A)
N . An alternative a ∈ A is dominated at RN if there
exists U ∈ P0(A), S ∈ P0(N) such that a ∈ U and P (a, S,RN ) ∈ E [U ](S).
The core of E at RN is the set of undominated alternatives. It is denoted
C(E , RN ). E is stable if C(E , RN ) 6= ∅ for all RN ∈ L(A)
N . We introduce a
1The idea to introduce a coalitional power description that depends on the state goes
back to Rosenthal (1972).
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partial order on the set of all local efectivity functions on (N,A) as follows:
E  E ′ if and only if : ∀U ∈ P0(A), ∀S ∈ P0(N) : E [U ](S) ⊂ E
′[U ](S).
Local effectivity functions that appear in the litterature may satisfy some
additional properties: The first one is monotonicity w.r.t. players:
(m) ∀U ∈ P0(A), ∀S ∈ P0(N), ∀T ∈ P0(N) : S ⊂ T ⇒ E [U ](S) ⊂ E [U ](T ),
The second, Possibility of Non-Action, is defined as follows:
(a) ∀U ∈ P0(A),∀S ∈ P0(N) : U ∈ E [U ](S),
The third one is the sheaf property:
(s) ∀S ∈ P0(N),∀U ∈ P0(A) : E [U ](S) = ∩a∈UE [{a}](S).
Although they may play a role in some circumstances, these properties are
not needed for the most part of this study. In the following remark we show
their impact on the core correspondence:
Remark 2.2 Let (x) be any of the properties (m), (a), (s). Given any local
effectivity function E we denote by E(x) the smallest (for ) local effectivity
function E ′ that satisfies property (x) and such that E  E ′. If we note E(xy)
the result on E of the operation (x) followed by the operation (y), it is easy to
see that E(xx) = E(x) and E(xy) = E(yx) (x, y ∈ {m,a, s}). Moreover for any
RN ∈ L(A)
N and any x ∈ {m,a, s} one has: C(E(x), RN ) = C(E , RN ). One
can prove that given two local effectivity functions E and F , C(E , RN ) =
C(F , RN ) for all RN ∈ L(A)
N if and only if E(mas) = F (mas).
We now present some notions that appear in social choice theory and show
how they can be viewed as particular cases of local effectivity functions. The
following can be traced back to Moulin and Peleg (1982):
Definition 2.3 An effectivity function on (N,A) is a mapping E : P(N)→
P(P0(A)) such that :
(i) E(S) = ∅ if and only if S = ∅,
(ii) B ∈ E(S), B ⊂ B′ ⇒ B′ ∈ E(S).
To any effectivity function E, we shall associate the local effectivity function
defined by: EE [U ] = E for any U ∈ P0(A). In this paper, an effectivitity
function E will be considered as a particular case of local effectivity function,
via the identification of E to EE. In an effectivity function the power of a
coalition is independent of the current state. An effectivity function is thus
the analog of a cooperative game with abstract payoffs.
Our second notion is a generalization of simple games as defined in Naka-
mura (1975):
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Definition 2.4 A local simple game on (N,A) is a collection W = (Wa, a ∈
A) where Wa ⊂ P0(N), (a ∈ A). When Wa = W for all a ∈ A, we have a
(standard) simple game (W,A).
Wa is the set of winning coalitions at a. The interpretation of a local simple
game is as follows: if the current state is a then any coalition in Wa has the
power to react so that to reach any b ∈ A. For U ∈ P0(A), put W[U ] :=
∩a∈UWa. To any local simple game, we associate a local effectivity function
that reflects the same power distribution. It is defined by E [U ](S) = P0(A)
if S ∈ W[U ] and E [U ](S) = {A} if S /∈ W[U ], S 6= ∅. In a local simple game,
given some current state, a coalition is either totally powerful or totally
powerless.
The third notion comes from strategic game theory. We consider a strate-
gic game form G = 〈(Xi)i∈N , A, g〉 where Xi is the strategy set of player i,
(i ∈ N) and g :
∏
i∈N Xi → A is the outcome function. We assume that g
is onto. If S ∈ P0(N) we denote by XS the cartesian product
∏
i∈S Xi. If
xN ∈ XN we may also write xN = (xS , xSc).
Definition 2.5 Let G be a strategic game form. The local effectivity func-
tion EG associated to G is defined as follows: For U ∈ P0(A), E
G[U ](∅) = ∅
and for S ∈ P0(N):
EG[U ](S) = {B ∈ P0(A)| ∀xN ∈ g
−1(U),∃yS ∈ XS : g(xSc , yS) ∈ B}
The β-effectivity function associated to G is defined by the formula: EGβ =
EG[A].
The local effectivity function associated to a strategic game form was first
introduced in Abdou (2000) in relation to strong Nash solvability. It satisfies
properties (m), (a) and (s). Note that this notion is of reactive type (or β-
type): given a current set of alternatives U , it tells whether a coalition S can
oppose it, by threatening to achieve some other set of alternatives namely
B.
3 Cycles
The notion of cycle is the basic object on which we shall build, in the next
section, our definition of index. It can be viewed as a generalization of
the famous Condorcet cycle. In the study of effectivity functions and their
stability, two elementary cycles appeared naturally in Abdou (1982). Gen-
eral cycles were defined in Keiding (1985). Later on this notion has been
extended to more general structures (Abdou and Keiding 2003). The follow-
ing definition is an adaptation of this notion to local effectivity functions.
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Definition 3.1 An r- tuple ((C1, B1, S1), . . . , (Cr, Br, Sr)) where r ≥ 1,
Ck ∈ P0(A), Bk ∈ P0(A), Sk ∈ P0(N) (k = 1, . . . , r) is an E-configuration
if:
(i) Bk ∈ E [Ck](Sk) (k = 1, . . . , r).
An E- configuration ((C1, B1, S1), . . . , (Cr, Br, Sr)) is a cycle if:
(ii) ∪rk=1Ck = A,
(iii) For any ∅ 6= J ⊂ {1, . . . , r} such that ∩k∈JSk 6= ∅, there exists k ∈ J
such that for all l ∈ J : Bk ∩ Cl = ∅.
(C1, . . . , Cr) is said to be the basis of the cycle and r its length. If (C1, . . . , Cr)
is a partition of A the cycle is said to be strict. E is said to be acyclic if it
has no cycle.
Condition (i) states that at any alternative in Ck, coalition Sk can achieve
Bk, and therefore that coalition Sk would object against Ck if it were in the
interest of its members to do so. Condition (ii) insures that all alternatives
will be opposed. Condition (iii) is a combinatorial property that insures
that the sequence of potential objections is somehow consistent. This con-
sistency concerns only intersecting families of coalitions. Let I be a subset
of {1, . . . , r} with ∩k∈ISk 6= ∅. One can see that if condition (iii) is ful-
filled for all non-empty subsets J of I, then there exists an order on I say
k1, · · · , k|I| such that [(Ck1∪· · ·∪Ckj)]∩[Bkj∪· · ·∪Bk|I|] = ∅ (j = 1, · · · , |I|).
Conversely if such an order exists then condition (iii) is fulfilled for all non-
empty subsets J of I. Using the notations of definition 3.1, some immediate
consequences are in order:
(1) For any cycle: Ck ∩ Bk = ∅ (k = 1, . . . , r). This is a consequence of
condition (iii), where we take J = {r}.
(2) For any cycle: ∩rk=1Bk = ∅: This follows from (1) and condition (ii).
(3) For any cycle: ∩rk=1Sk = ∅: If not, then by condition (iii) there would
exist k ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that Bk = ∅, a contradiction.
(4) Any cycle has length ≥ 2: Indeed, in view of (2) or (3) one has r > 1.
(5) Any cycle of length r gives rise to a strict cycle of length ≤ r. This can
be done as follows: Put C˜1 = C1 and C˜k = Ck \ ∪
k−1
l=1 Cl (2 ≤ k ≤ r), and
remove the indices k corresponding to empty C˜k.
6) Any cycle has length ≤ |A|. This follows from (5) since the cardinality of
a partition of A is less or equal to |A|.
Example 3.2 1) An E-configuration
(
(C1, B1, S1), (C2, B2, S2)
)
is a 2-cycle
if and only if : C1 ∪ C2 = A, S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and Bk ∩ Ck = ∅ (k = 1, 2).
2) An E-configuration
(
(C1, B1, S1), . . . , (Cr, Br, Sr)
)
such that for all k, l =
1, · · · , r, k 6= l, Sk ∩ Sl = ∅ is a cycle if and only if ∪
r
k=1Ck = A and
Ck ∩Bk = ∅ for all k ∈ {1, · · · , r}.
8
Let E be an effectivity function (definition 2.3). We define a cycle of E
simply as a cycle of EE, where EE is the local effectivity function associated
to E. We exhibit as an example two elementary types of cycles as they
appreared in Abdou (1982):
Example 3.3 (a) Let E be an effectivity function (definition 2.3). An
an r- tuple ((B1, S1), . . . , (Br, Sr)) where r ≥ 2, Sk ∈ P0(N), Bk ∈ E(Sk)
(k = 1, . . . , r), Bk∩Bl = ∅ (k 6= l) and ∩
r
k=1Sk = ∅ gives rise to a cycle of E.
We have a basis by putting: Ck = Bk−1, k = 2, . . . , r and C1 = A \ ∪
r
k=2Ck.
(b) Let E be an effectivity function. An an r- tuple ((B1, S1), . . . , (Br, Sr))
where r ≥ 2, Sk ∈ P0(N), Bk ∈ E(Sk) (k = 1, . . . , r), Sk∩Sl = ∅ (k 6= l) and
∩rk=1Bk = ∅ gives rise to a cycle of E. By putting Ck = B
c
k (k = 1, . . . , r)
(and removing those indices k with Bck = ∅) we have a basis.
It was asserted earlier (remark 2.2) that if E is any local effectivity func-
tion and if (x) is any of the properties (m), (a), (s) then E(x) and E have the
same core correspondence. As regards cycles, we have the following :
Remark 3.4
1) E(a) and E have the same cycles,
2) To any cycle of E(m) corresponds some cycle of E with the same basis
(hence the same length), and vice versa,
3) To any cycle of E corresponds some cycle of E(s) (not necessarily with the
same length), and vice versa.
We end this section by stating the main result that justifies the intro-
duction of cycles. In the case of effectivity functions, it was first proved
by Keiding (1985) (see also Abdou and Keiding, 1991, Theorem 5.3). For
a more general result that covers the case of local effectivity functions we
refer to Abdou and Keiding (2003), Theorem 6.
Theorem 3.5 A local effectivity function E is stable if and only if it is
acyclic.
4 Instability and the stability index
This section is devoted to the study of unstable local effectivity functions.
It would be interesting to have a typology of configurations that generate
instability. Since instability has to do with the existence of cycles (Theorem
3.5), it is clear that such a typology may be founded on the set of cycles.
As a first step toward this end, we shall provide an index that induces a
classification of unstable local effectivity functions. Obviously, no single
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integer can pretend to exhaust all features of instability. However, in order
that such an index be relevant some requirements seem to be natural:
(1) An index is a real number (or an integer) defined on the class of local
effectivity functions. It is relevant for the local effectivity function not for
the derived game contingent on some profile. The idea is to have an a priori
measure for the stability of power distribution allowed by some institutional
mechanism (e.g. written or unwritten political rules of government or jus-
tice), rather than a measure of the robustness of some concrete situation.
(2) If E and F are local effectivity functions with the same players and
the same alternatives and if all cycles in E are cycles in F then the index
of E must be greater or equal to the index of F . The index is thus an
increasing function of stability. If the latter is deemed a desirable property,
a mechanism with a higher index will be valued more than one with a lower
index.
Instability occurs with the emergence of some E- configuration that has
properties (ii) and (iii) of definition 3.1. This involves potentially the for-
mation of a coalition structure S1, . . . , Sr, and for k = 1 . . . , r, the devising
of a coordinated objection Bk within the members of Sk, that may oppose
Ck. Since the formation of coalitions and coordination of actions are rather
difficult and costly, we implicitly postulate that smaller E- configurations
are more likely to surface than larger ones2. Although cycles of the same
length may be very different in structure (see example 3.3 where cycle (b)
seems to be “simpler” than cycle (a)), we put forward the idea that a good
index of stability of power distribution has to do with the shortest cycles.
In accordance with this idea we introduce the following:
Definition 4.1 The stability index of E , denoted σ(E), is the minimal length
of a cycle in E . σ(E) is set to +∞ if E is acyclic.
Clearly our index satisfies the above requirements (1) and (2). Moreover it
is integer-valued, and for an unstable local effectivity function it takes values
between 2 and |A|.
Grouping alternatives plays an important role in the definition of the
index. If we were concerned only by characterizing stability we could have
restricted the study to E-configurations C ≡
(
(C1, B1, S1), . . . , (Cr, Br, Sr)
)
with |Ck| = 1 (k = 1, . . . , r). A cycle of this form is necessarily of length
|A|. Under such a restriction Theorem 3.5 would remain true but definition
4.1 would be useless. In a cycle Ck plays two roles: it is a set of alternatives
where Sk can implement its objection Bk, and the package that will be
2I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this motivation concerning our index and
for other suggestions that improved the content of this paper
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opposed by Sk. The following paragraph will give an insight into the role of
the sheaf property in packaging alternatives.
Let E be a local effectivity function that satisfies the sheaf propery (s).
Using notations of definition 3.1, let C ≡
(
(C1, B1, S1), . . . , (Cr, Br, Sr)
)
be
an E-configuration. C is said to be redundant if there exist indices k, k′
k 6= k′, such that Sk = Sk′ and Bk = Bk′ . By removing k
′ from the set of
indices and replacing Ck by Ck ∪Ck′, one obtains a shorter E-configuration,
say C′. If C is a cycle of E , then so is C′. It follows that the index of E is the
length of a non redundant cycle. If E does not satisfy the sheaf property,
it may well happen that C is a cycle but not C′ (see Remark 3.4 (3)). If
C is of minimal length, then the index of E is the length of C, a redundant
cycle. We see here the role played by grouping alternatives: for some reason
inherent in the power structure, coaltion Sk has to form twice in order to
devise the same objection Bk′ = Bk that will be opposed to Ck and Ck′ . If
we replace E by its sheaf cover E(s), then the index will drop at least by 1.
The following example illustrates this fact:
Example 4.2 N = {1, 2}, A = {a, b, c},
E [U ]({1}) = E [U ]({2}) = P0(A) if |U | = 1,
E [U ]({1}) = E [U ]({2}) = {A} if |U | ≥ 2,
E [U ](N) = P0(A) if U 6= ∅.
Any 2-cycle of E , say
(
(C1, B1, S1), (C2, B2, S2)
)
(example 3.2) is such that
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ . W.l.o.g we shall take S1 = {1}, S2 = {2}. Since C1 ∪C2 = A,
either |C1| ≥ 2 or |C2| ≥ 2. It follows that either B1 = A or B2 = A. This
contradicts B1 ∩ C1 = ∅ and B2 ∩ C2 = ∅. It follows that E has no cycle of
length 2. On the other hand, one can consider the sheaf cover E(s) of E :
E(s)[U ]({1}) = E(s)[U ]({2}) = E [U ](N) = P0(A) for all U 6= ∅,
so that we have a 2-cycle of E(s) if we take: C1 = {a, b}, B1 = {c}, S1 = {1},
C2 = {c}, B2 = {a}, S2 = {2}.
We conclude that E is an unstable local effectivity function such that σ(E) =
3 and σ(E(s)) = 2.
The following subsection will clariffy further the index definition via the
introduction of merger of alternatives.
4.1 Merging alternatives
Let f : A → A′ be a map, where A′ is an arbitrary finite set. Let E be a
local effectivity function on (N,A). We define the image Ef of E by f as
the local effectivity function on (N,A′) where, for any U ′ ∈ P0(A
′) :
Ef [U ′](S) = {B′ ∈ P0(A
′)| f−1(B′) ∈ E [(f−1(U ′)](S)}
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Lemma 4.3 For any local effectivity function E and any f : A → A′ one
has σ(E) ≤ σ(Ef )
Proof. The r-tuple
(
(C ′1, B
′
1, S1), . . . , (C
′
r, B
′
r, Sr)
)
is a cycle of Ef if and only
if
((
f−1(C ′1), f
−1(B′1), S1
)
, . . . ,
(
f−1(C ′r), f
−1(B′r), Sr
))
is a cycle of E . 
Now let
(
(C1, B1, S1), . . . , (Cr, Br, Sr)
)
be a cycle of E based on the partition
(C1, . . . , Cr). Let A
′ be some set with r elements A′ := {u1, . . . , ur} and
let f : A → A′ be defined by f(a) = uk if a ∈ Ck. Put B
′
k := f(Bk)
k = 1, · · · , r. For any k, l ∈ {1, . . . , r} one has Ck ∩ Bl = ∅ if and only
if {uk} ∩ f(Bl) = ∅. It follows that ({(u1}, B
′
1, S1), . . . , ({ur}, B
′
r, Sr)) is a
cycle of Ef based on the partition ({u1}, . . . , {ur}). Therefore we have the
following characterization:
Theorem 4.4 The stability index of a local effectivity function E is the
smallest integer s for which the following property holds:
There exists a surjection f : A→ {1, · · · , s} such that Ef is unstable.
Proof. Let s be the number defined in the claim. Then for some f : A →
{1, · · · , s}, Ef has a cycle. By Lemma 4.3 σ(E) ≤ σ(Ef ) ≤ s. Since there
exists a cycle of length σ(E) in E , using the argument that precedes the
statement, there exists a surjection f : A → {1, · · · , σ(E)} such that Ef is
unstable, so that s ≤ σ(E). It follows that s = σ(E). 
This characterization allows for an interpretation of the stability index.
Assume that a local effectivity function is unstable with a stability index
σ, then merging some alternatives results in a transformation of the local
effectivity function in a way that respects the power distribution. This is
the interpretation of the operation E → Ef . This transformation may occur,
for instance, when the agents cease to distinguish between two previously
distinct alternatives. If the cardinality of the new set is inferior to σ, then
the new local effectivity function is stable. In order to produce a deadlock,
players have to show some level of sophistication. Therefore if the legislator
seeks stability and if a stable mechanism is not available, the more acute is
the perception of alternatives, the higher index must be recommended.
Example 4.5 If the power distribution is such that σ = 2, then instability
takes a particularly simple form: alternatives can be partitioned into two
aggregates, or two major issues, on which the society is split, and the power
of coalitions allowed by the rules is such that both issues can be opposed and
neither one can be forced. Many countries present the property of being po-
litically split over two main issues. History and geography are accountable
for this bipolarity. The main issues can be of socioeconomic type, or of eth-
nic or religious type. Almost all Western countries are divided between left
and right, conservative and liberal, democrat and republican. Many Middle-
Eastern societies are split into pro-Western and anti-Western coalitions. In
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such a context, whatever are the original alternatives, the perception of po-
litical issues may be represented by f : A → A′, where |A′| = 2. Bipolarity
does not necessarily translate into instability. Indeed the stability index is
determined by the power distribution (constitution or unwritten rules of gov-
ernment) and in most Western countries (“democraties”), where governance
is based on a written constitution and elections, lawmakers strive to define
constitutions that avoid instability generated by any bipolar split: the index
is at least 3. By contrast some countries in the Middle-East did experience
recently this type of instability. Pro-Western coalitions formally became the
ruling power but they could not force any outcome. The anti-Western coali-
tion itself could oppose any outcome but could force none: Political analysts
express this situation by the vocable “stalemate” or “deadlock”: the index
is presumably 2.
When σ is high, some configurations leading to instability may be com-
binatorially complex and in order to produce them, the society must have
rather complex views.
Example 4.6 Some countries, though immune to bipolar deadlocks, could
experience more sophisticated types of instability. Many parties with dis-
tinct political agendas exist simultaneously. Legal institutions work cor-
rectly and choose some ruling coalition with some program. The ruling
coalition includes two or more parties who agree on some government issues.
But the exercice of power becomes impossible when there is a disagreement
within the coalition over the implementation of some new issue. Some party
in the opposition proposes an alliance to some component of the ruling coali-
tion. As a result the ruling coalition will eventually be overthrown, and new
elections will be held. This scenario may repeat itself. The social context
can be described by some map f with range ≥ 3. Lawmakers designed in-
stitutions that are immune againt bipolar instability so that the index is
presumably 3; but the degree of sophistication of the society is larger so
that instability may occur. It is important from the point of view of polit-
ical science to distinguish between this type of instability and the bipolar
stalemate.
The question of whether the probability (for instance when the preferences
are assumed to be uniformly distributed) of reaching a cyclic configuration
is related to the stability index remains open and is not addressed in this
paper. However this relation, if ever it exists, is not straightforward as
can be seen from the fact that two local effectivity functions may have the
same core correspondence but not the same index ! In view of remark 3.4
and the discussion following definition 4.1, it may occur that for some local
effectivity function E , the index of E(s) is strictly smaller than that of E .
However since E and E(s) have the same core correspondence, it follows that
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the set of profiles that lead to an empty core is the same for E and E(s). Any
index based on the probability of profiles with empty core would provide
equal values for E and E(s). Therefore such an index conveys a different
kind of information about stability than the one given by our index. In the
rest of this section we shall compute or simply localize the stability index of
some subclasses of local effectivity functions. We start by simple games.
4.2 Stability Index and the Nakamura Number
In the case of simple games there is a relationship between the stability
index and the Nakamura number as defined in Nakamura (1979). This
relationship casts light on the stability index and shows that, in a sense,
the stability index may be viewed as the analog of the Nakamura number
for local effectivity functions. Let W be a set of winning coalitions on N .
(S1, . . . , Sr) where Sk ∈ W (k = 1, . . . , r) is a said to be a non intersecting
family of W if ∩rk=1Sk = ∅. The Nakamura Number of W , denoted ν(W ),
is defined as the minimum length of a non intersecting family. If W has
no non intersecting family, then we set ν(W ) = +∞. Let W be a local
simple game on (N,A) as in definition 2.4. A 2r- tuple (U1, S1, . . . , Ur, Sr)
where Uk ∈ P0(A), Sk ∈ W[Uk] (k = 1, . . . , r) is said to be a cycle of W if
(U1, · · · , Ur) is a partition of A and ∩
r
k=1Sk = ∅. The natural number r is
the length of the cycle. We recall that the local effectivity function associated
to W (resp. (W,A) ) is EW (resp. EW,A). Let σ(W) (resp. σ(W,A)) denote
the stability index σ(EW ) (resp. σ(EW,A)). One has the following:
Lemma 4.7 Any cycle of W gives rise to some strict cycle of EW of the
same length and vice versa.
Proof. Let (U1, S1, . . . , Ur, Sr) be a cycle in W. Indices are taken in Z/rZ.
Let Bk := Uk+1 (k ∈ Z/rZ). We claim that
(
(U1, B1, S1), . . . , (Ur, Br, Sr)
)
is a strict cycle of EW : In order to prove condition (iii) of definition 3.1
we remark that if J is such that ∩j∈JSj 6= ∅ then J 6= {1, · · · , r} and we
can choose any k ∈ J such that k + 1 /∈ J . Conversely any strict cycle(
(U1, B1, S1), . . . , (Ur, Br, Sr)
)
in EW is such that (U1, · · · , Ur) is a partition
of A and ∩rk=1Sk = ∅. 
Corollary 4.8 For any simple game (W,A) one has :
σ(W,A) = ν(W ) if ν(W ) ≤ |A| (1)
= +∞ if ν(W ) > |A| (2)
In particular (W,A) is stable if and only if ν(W ) > |A|.
Proof. Let ν := ν(W ) and σ := σ(W,A). If ν ≤ |A|, let (S1, . . . , Sν) be a
non intersecting family of W . Let U1, . . . , Uν be any partition of A, then
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(U1, S1, . . . , Uν , Sν) is a cycle of (W,A). It follows that σ ≤ ν. Conversely
any cycle (U1, S1, . . . , Uσ, Sσ) implies that (S1, . . . , Sσ) is an intersecting
family, so that ν ≤ σ. If ν > |A| then there can be no cycle in (W,A) since
there is no partition of A of length ν. 
An alternative way to express the relationship between σ(W,A) and ν(W )
is as follows:
ν(W ) = σ(W,A) if σ(W,A) < +∞ (3)
> |A| if σ(W,A) = +∞ (4)
4.3 Stability index of Effectivity functions
It is possible to refine our knowledge of the stability index for some classes
of effectivity functions. For that purpose we recall some properties that
appear in the study of stability. As will be seen in this subsection they have
a fundamental role in the determination of the stability index. An effectivity
function E is said to be:
monotonic w.r.t. players if for all S, T ∈ P0(N),
S ⊂ T ⇒ E(S) ⊂ E(T ), (5)
regular if for all S1 ∈ P0(N), S2 ∈ P0(N),
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, B1 ∈ E(S1), B2 ∈ E(S2)⇒ B1 ∩B2 6= ∅, (6)
maximal if for all S ∈ P0(N), B ∈ P0(A),
Bc /∈ E(Sc) =⇒ B ∈ E(S), (7)
superadditive if for all S1 ∈ P0(N), S2 ∈ P0(N),
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, B1 ∈ E(S1), B2 ∈ E(S2)⇒ B1 ∩B2 ∈ E(S1 ∪ S2), (8)
subadditive if for all S1 ∈ P0(N), S2 ∈ P0(N),
B1 ∩B2 = ∅, B1 ∈ E(S1), B2 ∈ E(S2)⇒ B1 ∪B2 ∈ E(S1 ∩ S2). (9)
The β-Effectivity function EGβ associated to a strategic game form G (defi-
nition 2.5) satisfies monotonicity w.r.t. players and maximality. Therefore
studying the maximal case is particularly important for applications. Su-
peradditivity and subadditivity play a crucial role in the description of the
structure of cycles. If an effectivity function is subadditive then it has no
cycle of type (a) of example 3.3; it it is superadditive, then it has no cycle
ot type (b). It is interesting to note that in the case of maximal effectiv-
ity functions, the absence of such cycles (types (a) or (b)) is equivalent to
stability. The following clear cut result that can be deduced from Abdou
(1982) and Peleg (1984) (Theorem 6.A.9) is reproduced here for future use:
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Theorem 4.9 Let E be a maximal effectivity function. The following are
equivalent:
(i) E is stable,
(ii) E is superadditive and subadditive,
(iii) E has no cycles of type (a) or (b) of example 3.3.
As regards the stability index, we can establish, relying on Theorem 4.9, the
following:
Theorem 4.10 Let E be an effectivity function. Then:
(i) σ(E) > 2 if and only if E is regular.
(ii) Assume that E is maximal. Then σ(E) ∈ {2, 3,+∞}.
Proof. (i) Let
(
(C1, B1, S1), (C2, B2, S2)
)
be a 2-cycle. Then S1 ∩ S2 =
∅, C1 ∪ C2 = A, Bi ∈ E(Si), Bi ⊂ C
c
i (i = 1, 2), so that B1 ∩ B2 ⊂
Cc1 ∩ C
c
2 = ∅. This contradicts regularity. Conversely if ((S1, B1), (S2, B2))
is such that Bi ∈ E(Si) (i = 1, 2), S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and B1 ∩ B2 = ∅ then
((Bc1, B1, S1), (B
c
2, B2, S2)) is 2-cycle.
(ii) In view of Theorem 4.9, a maximal effectivity function is stable if and
only if it is subadditive and superadditive. In that case σ(E) = +∞. If E
is not superadditive then there exists S1, S2 ∈ P0(N), B1, B2 ∈ P0(A) such
that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, B1 ∈ E(S1), B2 ∈ E(S2) and B1 ∩ B2 /∈ E(S1 ∪ S2).
Put S3 = (S1 ∪ S2)
c, B3 = (B1 ∩ B2)
c. By maximality B3 ∈ E(S3) so that(
(Bc1, B1, S1), (B
c
2, B2, S2), (B
c
3, B3, S3)
)
is a cycle. A similar proof can be
done if E is not subadditive. Therefore σ(E) ≤ 3. 
Since most effectivity functions met in applications are the β-effectivity
of some game form, and since those are maximal, theorem 4.10 can be viewed
as a rather negative result.
4.4 Stability Index of Local Effectivity Functions
In order to obtain some precise indications on the stability index of a local
effectivity function, we shall define some simpler objects that it induces and
that play a role in its stability. In his study of strong Nash solvability, to-
gether with the local effectivity functions associated to a game form, Abdou
(1995) introduced a property called exactness. The latter generalizes “exact
maximality”, a property found in Li (1991). Here we extend this defini-
tion to general local effectivity functions. Starting from a local effectivity
function E we define two simpler objets:
The global effectivity function derived from E is the mapping E0 : P(N) →
P(P0(A)) such that all S ∈ P(N): E0(S) := E [A](S).
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The exact effectivity function derived from E is the mapping Eξ : P(N) →
P(P0(A)) such that Eξ(∅) = ∅ and for S ∈ P0(S), by:
Eξ(S) := {B ∈ P0(A) | B = A or ∃a /∈ B,B ∈ E [{a}](S)} (10)
Note that properties (i) and (ii) of definition 2.3 are satisfied by E0, whereas
Eξ does not necessarily satisfy property (ii) (monotonicity w.r.t. alterna-
tives) so that it is not an “effectivity function”. In general it is clear from
the definitions that for all S ∈ P0(N), E0(S) ⊂ Eξ(S).
Definition 4.11 A local effectivity function E is said to be exact if E0 = Eξ.
A local effectivity function E is said to be maximal if E0 is maximal.
Note that exactness conveys some information only in the framework of local
effectivity functions. In the subclass of effectivity functions, that is, in the
case where E is independent of U , it is always true that E0 = Eξ = E [U ] (for
any U ∈ P0(N)). Exactness together with maximality will shed light on the
structure of local effectivity functions with respect to the stability/instability
problem. In what follows we investigate the impact of exactness on the core
correspondence and cycles of E . Clearly C(E , RN ) ⊂ C(E0, RN ) for all
RN ∈ L(A)
N and any cycle of E0 is a cycle of E . In addition on has:
Proposition 4.12 If E is exact, then:
(i) C(E0, RN ) = C(E , RN ) for all RN ∈ L(A)
N ,
(ii) E and E0 have the same cycles.
Proof. (i) Let RN ∈ L(A)
N . If a is dominated in E at RN , then for
some S ∈ P0(N), P (a, S,RN ) ∈ E [{a}](S). Since a /∈ P (a, S,RN ), one has
P (a, S,RN ) ∈ Eξ(S) = E0(S) so that a is dominated in E0. This proves
C(E0, RN ) ⊂ C(E , RN ). Since the opposite inclusion is always true, we have
proved (i).
(ii) If the r-tuple
(
(C1B1, S1), . . . , (Cr, Br, Sr)
)
is a cycle in E , then in par-
ticular Ck ∩ Bk = ∅, Ck 6= ∅ and since Bk ∈ E [Ck](Sk) it follows that
Bk ∈ Eξ(Sk) = E0(Sk), so that this r-tuple is also a cycle in E0. Since
conversely, in all cases, any cycle in E0 is a cycle in E , we have proved (ii).

Lemma 4.13 Assume that E is maximal and not exact. Then:
(i) there exists RN ∈ L(A)
N such that C(E , RN ) = ∅ and if further E0 is
monotonic w.r.t. players we have in addition |C(E0, RN )| = 1.
(ii) there exists a cycle of length at most 3 in E, that is not a cycle in E0.
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Proof. (i) Let S ∈ P0(N), B ∈ P0(N) such that B ∈ Eξ(S) and B /∈ E0(S).
Then there exists a ∈ Bc such that B ∈ E [{a}](S) and Bc ∈ E0(S
c). Define
a profile RN such that: for i ∈ S, B R
i {a} Ri Bc \ {a} and for i ∈ Sc,
{a} Ri Bc \ {a} Ri B. If b ∈ B then P (b, Sc, RN ) ⊃ B
c ∈ E0(S
c), so that b
is dominated in E0. If b ∈ B \ {a}, then P (b,N,RN ) ⊃ {a}. By maximality
of E0, E0(N) = P0(A), so that b is dominated in E0. Therefore one has
C(E0, RN ) ⊂ {a}. Now P (a, S,RN ) = B ∈ E [{a}](S) implies that a is
dominated in E , and since C(E , RN ) ⊂ C(E0, RN ) we have C(E , RN ) = ∅.
If moreover E0 is monotonic w.r.t. players, then for T ∈ P0(N), T ⊂ S we
have P (a, T,RN ) = B /∈ E0(T ) and for T ∩S
c 6= ∅ we have P (a, T,RN ) = ∅
so that a is not dominated in E0. We conclude that C(E0, RN ) = {a}.
(ii) Put S1 = S, S2 = S
c, S3 = N , B1 = B,B2 = B
c, B3 = {a}, C1 =
{a}, C2 = B,C3 = B
c \ {a}. In E this defines a 3-cycle if C3 6= ∅, and a
2-cycle if C3 = ∅, that is not a cycle in E0.
As an immediate consequence of Lemma 4.13 we have the following propo-
sition that provides, when E0 is maximal, a partial converse to Proposition
4.12:
Proposition 4.14 Assume that E is maximal.
(i) If E0 is monotonic w.r.t. players then E is exact if and only if C(E0, RN ) =
C(E , RN ) for all RN ∈ L(A)
N .
(ii) E is exact if and only if E0 and E have the same cycles.
In what follows, we summarize the main results concerning stability of local
effectivity functions. This can be viewed as a generalization to the local
effectivity functions, of Theorem 3.11 of Abdou (2000) where only objects
derived from a game form were considered:
Theorem 4.15 Assume that E is maximal. Then the following are equiva-
lent:
(i) E is stable
(ii) E is exact and E0 is stable.
(iii) E is exact and E0 is superadditive and subadditive.
Moreover in that case C(E0, RN ) = C(E , RN ) for all RN ∈ L(A)
N .
Proof. If E is stable then E0 is stable and by the first part of assertion
(i) of Lemma 4.13, E is exact. Conversely if E is exact, then C(E0, RN ) =
C(E , RN ) for all RN ∈ L(A)
N by Lemma 4.12 assertion (i), and if moreover
E0 is stable it follows that E is stable. This estabilshes the equivalence
between (i) and (ii). The equivalence with (iii) follows from Theorem 4.9.

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As regards instability one can obtain precise indications on the index.
For that purpose we assert the following:
Theorem 4.16 (i) σ(E) = 2 if E0 is not regular.
(ii) Assume that E is maximal. Then σ(E) ∈ {2, 3,+∞}
Proof. If E0 is not regular then 2 ≤ σ(E) ≤ σ(E0) = 2, we conclude that
σ(E) = 2. This proves (i). In order to prove (ii) assume that E0 is maximal.
We consider first the case where E is not stable. Two subcases are possible.
In the first subcase E0 is stable, then by Theorem 4.15 E is not exact and
by Lemma 4.13 assertion (ii) E has a cycle of length ≤ 3, so that σ(E) ≤ 3.
In the second subcase E0 is not stable then by Theorem 4.10 σ(E0) ≤ 3
and since σ(E) ≤ σ(E0) we conclude again that σ(E) ≤ 3. Since in the case
where E is stable σ(E) = +∞, we have proved (ii). 
Remark 4.17 If E satisfies the non-action property (a) and the sheaf prop-
erty (s) (see subsection 2.2) then (i) in 4.16 can be improved to read as fol-
lows: σ(E) = 2 if and only if E0 is not regular: If
(
(C1, B1, S1), (C2, B2, S2)
)
is a 2-cycle, then C1 ∪ C2 = A, S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, C1 ⊂ B
c
1 and C2 ⊂ B
c
2,
B1 ∈ E [C1](S1), B2 ∈ E [C2](S2). It follows that C
c
1 ∈ E [C1](S1) and
Cc2 ∈ E [C2](S2) and in view of properties (a) and (s), C
c
1 ∈ E [A](S1) and
Cc2 ∈ E [A](S2). Since E [A] = E0, S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and C
c
1 ∩ C
c
2 = ∅ we deduce
that E0 is not regular.
As regards applications Theorem 4.16 can also be viewed as a rather
negative result. Moreover, by the same theorem, the two types of instability
described in examples 4.5 and 4.6 appear as paradigmatic.
4.5 Stability Index of strategic game forms
Let G be a strategic game form. For any preference profile, two coalitional
solutions may be considered: the β-core and the exact core of G. Those
are respectively the core of EGβ and E
G
β (see Abdou (2000)). We denote by
σ0(G) and σ1(G) the stability index of E
G
β and E
G
β respectively. G is said
to be superadditive (resp. subadditive) if EGβ is superadditive. G is said to
be tight if EGβ is regular. G is said to be exact if E
G
β is exact. It is easy
to see that, for any game form G, EGβ is maximal, and if G is tight then G
is superadditive. We therefore have a nice classification of strategic game
forms:
Proposition 4.18 Let G be a game form. Then:
(i) σ0(G) = σ1(G) = 2 if and only if G is not tight,
(ii) σ0(G) = σ1(G) = 3 if and only if G is tight and not subadditive,
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(iii) σ0(G) = +∞, σ1(G) = 3 if and only if G is tight, subadditive and not
exact,
(iii) σ0(G) = σ1(G) = +∞ if and only if G is tight subadditive and exact.
We recall that a game form G = (X1, . . . ,Xn, A, g) is said to be rectan-
gular if for any a ∈ A, g−1(a) =
∏n
i=1 Yi, for some Yi ⊂ Xi, (i = 1, . . . , n)
(Gurvich (1978, 1989) and Abdou (1998, 2000)). In particular the normal
form associated to any finite extensive game form where final nodes carry
distinct outcomes (such extensive forms are called free), is rectangular. Ex-
actness is a very discriminating property for the class of rectangular game
forms. Indeed, in view of Theorem 4.7 of Abdou (2000), any exact rectan-
gular game form G is essentially a one-player game form. The index σ1(G)
for rectangular game forms can thus be determined with good precision:
Corollary 4.19 Let G be a rectangular game form. Then there are three
exclusive cases: (i) σ1(G) = 2 if and only if G is not tight, (ii) σ1(G) = +∞
if and only if G is exact, (iii) σ1(G) = 3 if and only if G is tight and not
exact.
Proof: By the remark that precedes our statement, it follows that EGβ is
stable if and only if G is exact. If G is not exact, then either G is not tight
and in this case σ1(G) = 2, or it is tight and by 4.18 (ii) (iii), σ1(G) = 3. 
Remark 4.20 None of the cases of the corollary is empty. This can be con-
cluded from Abdou (1998) or Gurvich (1978, 1989): A free extensive game
form is strategically equivalent to some perfect information free extensive
game form if and only if it tight. It follows that any free extensive game form
Γ that is not equivalent to some free perfect information extensive game form
is in (i). Any Γ that is equivalent to some free perfect information extensive
game form Γ′, is in (ii) when, in Γ′, at most one player has multiple choices,
and is in (iii) when, in Γ′, at least two players have multiple choices.
5 Conclusion
We defined a stability index for local effectivity functions and showed its
connection to the Nakamura Number of simple games. We proved that
for any unstable maximal local effectivity function the index is either 2 or
3. Since strategic game forms induce maximal local effectivity functions,
our result may be viewed as a rather negative one. This study constitutes
a first step in the comprehension of the nature of instability. It would
be interesting to compute the stability index of neutral and anonymous
effectivity functions: this is a challenging combinatorial exercice. The same
definition of the stability index may be extended to more general interaction
forms, especially to those derived from strategic game forms. The study of
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their stability index would give an insight into the nature of the instability
involved in the underlying equilibrium concept.
References
Abdou, J., 1982. Stabilite´ de la fonction veto, Cas du veto maximal.
Mathe´matiques et Sciences Humaines 80, 39 – 63.
Abdou, J., 1995. Nash and strongly consistent two-player game forms. In-
ternational Journal of Game Theory 24, 345 – 356.
Abdou, J., 1998. Rectangularity and tightness: a normal form characteriza-
tion of perfect information extensive game forms. Math. of oper. research
23, No 3, 553-567.
Abdou, J., 2000. Exact stability and its applications to strong solvability.
Mathematical Social Sciences 39, 263 – 275.
Abdou, J. and Keiding H., 1991. Effectivity functions in social choice.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
Abdou, J. and Keiding H., 2003. On necessary and sufficient conditions for
solvability of game forms. Mathematical Social Sciences 46, 243 – 260.
Gurvich, V.A., 1978. Application of Boolean functions and contact schemes
in game theory. Candidate’s dissertation Moskow, Fiz-Tekn. Inst. Russian.
Gurvich, V.A., 1989. Equilibrium in pure strategies. Soviet Math. Dokl.
38, 597-602.
Keiding, H., 1985. Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effec-
tivity functions. International Journal of Game Theory 14, 93 – 101.
Li, S., 1991. Strongly consistent game forms. Social Choice and Welfare 11,
177 – 192.
Moulin, H. and Peleg, B., 1982. Cores of effectivity functions and imple-
mentation theory. Journal of Mathematical Economics 10, 115 –162.
Nakamura, K.,1975. The Core of a Simple Game with Ordinal Preferences.
International Journal of Game Theory 4, Issue 1/2, 95 – 104.
Nakamura, K., 1979. The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences.
International Journal of Game Theory 8, issue 1, 55 – 61.
Peleg, B., 1984. Game theoretic analysis of voting in committees. Cam-
bridge University Press, Gambridge.
Peleg, B., 1998. Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights. Social
Choice and Welfare 15: 67–80.
Peleg, B. and Winter, E., 2002. Constitutional implementation. Review of
Economic Design 7, 187–204.
Peleg, B., 2004. Representation of Effectivity functions by acceptable game
21
forms: a complete characterization. Mathematical Social Sciences 47, 275–
287.
Peleg, B. and Peters, H., 2008. Nash consistent representations of effectivity
functions through lottery models. Forthcoming in Games and Economic
Behavior .
Rosenthal, R.W., 1972. Cooperative games in effectiveness form, J. Econ.
Theory 5 88101.
22
